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      This paper aims to provide an account of the relationship between transcendental claims 
and the project of using transcendental argumentation that differs from the mainstream 
literature.1 By a ‘transcendental claim’, I mean a proposition which states that y is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of x.2 In much of the literature, such claims are said to have as 
their primary value the overcoming of various sceptical positions. I argue that whilst 
transcendental arguments may be narrowly characterised as anti-sceptical, transcendental 
claims do not have to be used in only this way, and in fact can be useful in several areas of 
philosophy outside the issue of scepticism, and so can be used by transcendental arguments 
more broadly conceived. I offer four examples of transcendental claims that are not used in 
narrow, anti-sceptical transcendental arguments. I argue that these broader arguments use 
transcendental claims but not in an anti-sceptical way. From this, I conclude that one can 
separate the project of making transcendental claims and the project of using transcendental 
arguments to defeat scepticism. Given the well-known difficulties transcendental arguments 
in this narrow sense seem to have had in defeating scepticism,3 distinguishing narrow 
transcendental arguments clearly from transcendental claims as such in this manner can 
provide a way for the latter to still serve an important role in philosophy, by showing how 
such claims can be used more broadly, regardless of any doubts one may have about the anti-
sceptical value of such claims.         
                                                 
1 Cassam (1987, 1997, 1999), Franks (1999, 2005), Grayling (1985), Körner (1966), Peacocke (1989), Sacks 
(1999, 2005a, 2005b), Stapelford (2008), Stern (2000, 2007, 2011), Strawson (1959, 1966, 1985), Stroud (1968, 
1999, 2000), Walker (1989).   
2 Of course, the sense of a necessity in a transcendental claim is not a mere causal necessity. The question then 
is whether it is apt to regard transcendental claims as having their apodictic content in terms of logical necessity 
or metaphysical necessity. Those who argue that the sense of necessity is logical necessity are Bennett (1979), 
Bell (1999), Walker (1978, 1989). However, most philosophers who are interested in transcendental claims are 
more inclined to suggest that the sense of necessity is not logical, but rather some kind of metaphysical 
necessity. I take the ‘necessary condition for the possibility of x’ clause to mean that y is not just a necessary 
condition for x being actual, but for x being possible; so obtaining in any possible world, not just this one. This 
is why a transcendental claim is a claim concerning the necessary conditions for the possibility of x as opposed 
to just being a necessary condition for x. Understood in this way, my definition of a transcendental claim does 
not entail that all necessity claims count as transcendental, because the sense of necessity involved in a 
transcendental claim is stronger than natural necessity.   
3 For the problems that face the use of transcendental arguments to defeat scepticism, see Körner (1966), Stroud 
(1968), Hookway (1999), and Stern (1999, 2000, 2007).  
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I 
      A transcendental argument, as typically understood, is a deductive argument designed to 
establish that p, by arguing from q, and the claim that p is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of q. Typically, the approach of transcendental arguments begins with a non-
controversial starting point, q, where a characteristic starting point would be a fact about how 
human beings think about, judge or experience certain things, including ourselves. The 
argument then proceeds from this kind of claim to a more controversial claim, where this 
kind of proposition is a transcendental claim, the claim that plays the role of the second 
premise. A transcendental claim is one which states that p is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of q.  As Robert Stern writes, “the form of the argument is: we have certain 
experiences etc.; a necessary condition for us having these experiences etc. is the truth of [p]; 
therefore [p]” (Stern 2007, 144). One example of such a claim is the proposition that we 
experience things in space and time.   
      Now, according to P. F. Strawson, “the point of transcendental arguments in general is an 
anti-sceptical point” (Strawson 1985, 10).4 I take this to mean the following: (i) the target of 
a transcendental argument is some kind of sceptic, where depending on the specific 
dialectical context, this sceptic could be a sceptic about other minds, a sceptic about 
knowledge claims of a mind-independent external world, a moral sceptic, etc.; (ii) the value 
of a transcendental argument principally consists in the argument’s ability to successfully 
defeat the relevant sceptical position.  
To see transcendental arguments in action, we would perhaps do well to briefly look at 
the structure of Kant’s argument in the Refutation of Idealism, which appears to be a locus 
classicus of transcendental argumentation:5  
 
I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination in regard 
to time presupposes the existence of something permanent in perception. But this 
permanent something cannot be something in me, for the very reason that my existence 
in time is itself determined by this permanent something. It follows that the perception 
of this permanent existence is possible only through a thing without me and not through 
the mere representation of a thing without me. Consequently, the determination of my 
existence in time is possible only through the existence of real things external to me. 
Now, consciousness in time is necessarily connected with the consciousness of the 
                                                 
4 Compare Strawson’s remark here with a remark from Jonathan Lear and Barry Stroud: “… the value of a 
transcendental argument is thought to consist in its ability to combat scepticism” (Lear and Stroud 1984, 219).  
5 There are two things which need to be noted here: firstly, Bell (1999) questions whether the Refutation of 
Idealism is in fact a transcendental argument at all. Secondly, there is a general issue of whether or not it is 
possible to talk about transcendental arguments from outside the concerns of transcendental idealism or even 
Kantianism tout court. For discussion of whether transcendental arguments found a place other than in 
transcendental idealism, see Beiser (2005), Franks (1999, 2005), and Taylor (1972).   
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possibility of this determination in time. Hence it follows that consciousness in time is 
necessarily connected also with the existence of things without me, inasmuch as the 
existence of these things is the condition of determination in time. That is to say, the 
consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of 
the existence of other things without me. (B275-6) 
 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, the Refutation of Idealism is directed at the “problematic 
idealism of Descartes”, which claims that the existence of mind-independent objects in space 
is subject to sceptical doubt. Kant begins his argument with a claim which the sceptic 
accepts, namely that we are self-conscious and aware of our inner mental episodes as having 
a temporal order. The argument of the Refutation then proceeds to show that we cannot be 
self-conscious and aware of our inner mental episodes as having a temporal order unless there 
really does exist an external world. Using Stern’s formulation of the argument enables us to 
see its exact details:6  
 
(1) You are aware of your inner mental states (thoughts and sensations) as having a 
temporal order (e.g., that the sensation of pain you are having now was preceded in 
time by a feeling of pleasure). 
(2) To be aware of your mental states as having a temporal order, you must be aware of 
something that existed from the time of your previous mental state to the present. 
(3) For that awareness of permanence to be possible, it is not sufficient to have awareness 
of your self. 
(4) Therefore, the “permanent” of which you are aware must be something that is neither 
you qua subject nor your subjective impressions but must be something distinct from 
both of these, that is, an object outside you in the external world. 
(5) Therefore, your awareness of the external world cannot come from a prior awareness 
of your subjective impressions because the latter awareness is not possible without the 
former, and so awareness of the external world cannot be based on the imagination 
but rather comes from generally veridical experiences. 
 
By starting with a premise which the sceptic accepts, the sceptic is led through transcendental 
claims which she must accept if she is to remain committed to (1).7 Thus, the sceptic is 
                                                 
6 R. Stern, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/transcendental-arguments/ 
7 Another kind of sceptic, however, may wish to resist (1). Prima facie, this means that Kant’s transcendental 
argument is powerless against more radical forms of scepticism, such as scepticism about the validity of laws of 
logic. But even if Kant’s transcendental argument is powerless against more radical scepticism, it is far from 
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refuted on the grounds that she must presuppose what in fact she seeks to deny. As Kant 
himself writes, “[we] turn the game played by idealism against itself” (B276).8 
      What our overview of the structure of a transcendental argument has revealed so far is 
that as a matter of fact their use has often been anti-sceptical, and indeed this is taken as 
definitive of them in some quarters. However, one may well now ask whether having an anti-
sceptical function and having an anti-sceptical value is constitutive of the project of 
transcendental argumentation. Let us call this ‘The Constitutive Question’. I think there are 
no compelling reasons to think transcendental arguments sans phrase are constitutively 
directed at sceptics, since the formal schema of a transcendental argument through which 
such arguments are defined – to establish that p, by arguing from q, and the claim that p is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of q – does not specify p and q as such. . 
      However, that being said, there is one genus of transcendental argument that is 
characteristically designed to be anti-sceptical, one which may be dubbed as narrow 
transcendental argumentation: here, the transcendental argument is supposed to begin with a 
premise that no reasonable sceptic can doubt. The putative advantage of such a starting point 
is that the proponent of the relevant transcendental argument refutes the sceptic in a head-on 
manner without the problems of bringing in any other epistemological commitments or 
further philosophical ideas. In other words, the structure of a transcendental argument is 
designed to prevent any question-begging claims against the sceptics or anything else that the 
sceptic would likely reject, because what the transcendental argument aims to do is show that 
scepticism is incoherent on its own terms.9 Secondly, another feature of narrow 
transcendental arguments is the deductively valid logical form of these arguments. For, whilst 
narrow transcendental arguments make use of empirical claims in some non-controversial 
starting points, the conclusion of a narrow transcendental argument is meant to deductively 
follow from the premises, in order to reject the relevant sceptical position. Such arguments 
may thus seem to have greater anti-sceptical force than any more inductive or abductive 
                                                                                                                                                        
obvious that the transcendental argument’s inability to shift the sceptic from the sceptic’s position is a weakness 
or even failing on the part of the transcendental argument. This is because one has compelling reason to regard 
radical forms of scepticism as unintelligible themselves, given how little basic dialectical ground they are 
prepared to give the transcendental theorist or for that matter any anti-sceptical position simpliciter.   
8 A classic example of an analytic transcendental argument is Strawson’s ‘objectivity argument’ in The Bounds 
of Sense, cf. (Strawson 1966, 97-112). Furthermore, one could also understand Wittgenstein’s Private Language 
Argument as an example of a transcendental argument. However, this kind of interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
concerns in that argument is usually based on Saul Kripke’s reading of the Private Language Argument, cf. 
Kripke (1982).   
9 As Strawson writes, “[the sceptic’s] doubts are unreal, not simply because they are logically unresolvable 
doubts, but because they amount to the rejection of the whole conceptual scheme within which alone such 
doubts make sense”. (Strawson 1959, 35) 
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approach. Thirdly, the kinds of question that a narrow transcendental argument aims to 
answer are justificatory challenges to the anti-sceptic, where failing to justify how knowledge 
is possible or how morality is possible will inevitably lead to scepticism about those kinds of 
phenomena. One might wish to claim that the kinds of questions narrow transcendental 
arguments are designed to answer are in fact rather ambiguous, to the extent that asking how 
x is possible can also be taken to herald a descriptive/explanatory challenge for the anti-
sceptic to explain to other anti-sceptics why/how we have knowledge or why/how we are able 
to be moral. However, it is not clear that such a descriptive question can ever be genuinely 
separated from the justificatory question. For example, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
began asking how we have synthetic a priori knowledge in terms of providing an explanation 
for how such knowledge is possible for us given our cognitive architecture. However, the 
question concerning the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge is quickly transformed 
into the justificatory challenge of providing persuasive reasons to think that we are justified 
in thinking we have such a kind of knowledge. Given these various considerations, it seems 
not just that as a matter of fact narrow transcendental arguments have been anti-sceptical, but 
that it is in the nature of such arguments to be so. 
      Thus far, we have seen that some transcendental arguments may be characteristically anti-
sceptical, because of the nature of their starting points, the logical structure of the arguments, 
and the particular kind of question they are designed to answer. However, one may now ask 
whether transcendental claims have to be anti-sceptical. For, if there is compelling reason to 
think that transcendental claims do not have to be anti-sceptical, then we have compelling 
reason to think that the project of making transcendental claims can be separated from the 
project of narrow transcendental argumentation, leaving open the possibility of 
transcendental arguments using those claims that at the same time are not anti-sceptical in 
nature. In other words, whilst the project of narrow transcendental argumentation 
constitutively involves situating transcendental claims within the framework of an anti-
sceptical transcendental argument, the project of making transcendental claims does not 
constitutively involve situating those propositions within the framework of a narrow 
transcendental argument. It is to this issue that I now wish to turn.  
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II 
       The first transcendental claim I would like to draw attention to is Hegel’s idea in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit that conceptual articulation is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of language. Consider the following from Charles Taylor, who writes: 
 
The new theory of language that arises at the end of the eighteenth century, most 
notably in the work of Herder and Humboldt, not only gives a new account of how 
language is essential to human thought, but also places the capacity to speak not simply 
in the individual but primarily in the speech community. This totally upsets the outlook 
of the mainstream epistemological tradition. Now arguments to this effect have formed 
part of the refutation of atomism that has proceeded through an overturning of standard 
modern epistemology. 
      Important examples of arguments of this kind are Hegel’s in the first chapter of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, against the position he defines as “sensible certainty,” where 
he shows both the indispensability of language and its holistic character; and 
Wittgenstein’s famous demonstrations of the uselessness of “ostensive definitions,” 
where he makes plain the crucial role played by language in identifying the object and 
the impossibility of a purely private language. Both are, I believe, excellent examples of 
arguments that explore the conditions of intentionality and show their conclusions to be 
inescapable. (Taylor 1987, 13) 
 
 
According to Taylor, an important feature of Hegel’s discussion of Sense-Certainty is 
Hegel’s aim to show how the necessary conditions for the possibility of language render the 
position of Sense-Certainty incoherent. Crucially, though, Hegel does not use the 
transcendental claim – that having and exercising conceptual capacities is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of language – in order to target and then refute a sceptic who 
claims that language is not possible. For, Hegel’s target10 in the opening chapter of the 
Phenomenology is someone who thinks that reference is possible by virtue of providing 
ostensive definitions.11 In other words, according to the Sense-Certainty theorist, I am able to 
pick out individual objects and label such objects as those objects simply by pointing to those 
and only using ostensive indexicals. As Robert Pippin writes, “... the goal [of Hegel’s 
argument] is obviously to demonstrate that even the simplest form of demonstrative reference 
                                                 
10 Someone may claim that there seems very little to prevent one from thinking that Hegel’s target is a sceptic of 
sorts, where the sense-certainty theorist is seen as a sceptic about the social nature of language. As such, there 
would then be no compelling ground to clearly differentiate the targets of transcendental arguments and the 
targets of the project of making transcendental claims. In response to this, I do not think there is good reason to 
suppose that the sense-certainty theorist can be portrayed as a sceptic. My worry is that scepticism is being 
understood in such ways that pretty much every philosophical position is a sceptical position of sorts: 
nominalists are sceptics about universals; realists are sceptics about nominalist metaphysics; non-conceptualists 
are sceptics about conceptual content; conceptualists are sceptics about non-conceptual content.    
11 For further on Hegel’s transcendental concerns in Sense-Certainty, see Taylor (1972), Dulckeit (1986), Pippin 
(1989), Pinkard (1994), Stern (2012), and Houlgate (forthcoming).  
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would not be possible without some describing capacity, a capacity that requires descriptive 
terms or predicates ... not merely deictic expressions and atomic objects” (Pippin 1989, 117). 
To see how this works, let us briefly consider Hegel’s argument: according to the sense-
certainty theorist, I can pick out and refer to an individual object by pointing to it and 
dubbing it the here-and-now. For sense-certainty, here-and-now is meant to capture a unique 
feature of an object and thus enable me to refer to that individual object. However, Hegel 
proceeds to argue that being here-and-now is far from unique to the object, as different times 
and places can come be to be here-and-now, and thus so can different things. Sense-certainty, 
therefore, has failed to properly refer to this particular object by virtue of picking out its 
singular individuality, because all that sense-certainty has been able to do is to pick out a 
property that can belong to many individuals, a property which is universal.12 Not only that, 
the ultimate problem with sense-certainty’s commitment to referring to individual objects 
without reference to concepts – what Hegel calls apprehension – is that the non-conceptual 
‘describing’ capacities fail to refer simpliciter, because what we discover in the dialectic of 
sense-certainty is that concepts and a holistic logico-linguistic framework13 are necessary 
conditions for the possibility of language and that sense-certainty therefore can be refuted on 
grounds that it violates the necessary conditions for the possibility of language and is thus 
incoherent. In this instance at least, we have found a transcendental claim that is not situated 
within the framework of narrow transcendental argumentation. 
      Consider now another Hegelian argument, one which appears to argue for a 
transcendental claim concerning the metaphysical structure of infinity:   
 
[It is said that] the infinite, one the one side, exists by itself, and that the finite has gone 
forth from it into a separate existence …; but it should rather be said that this separation 
is incomprehensible ... But equally it must be said that they are comprehensible, to 
grasp them even as they are in ordinary conception, to see that in the one there lies the 
determination of the other … is to see the simple insight into their inseparability … This 
unity of the finite and infinite and the distinction between them are just as inseparable as 
are finitude and infinity. (Science of Logic: 153-154) 
                                                 
12 “...in this simplicity [Now] is indifferent to what happens in it; just as little as Night and Day are its being, just 
as much also is it Day and Night; it is not in the least affected by this its other-being. A simple thing of this kind 
which is through negation, which is neither This nor That, a not-This, and is with equal indifference This as well 
as That – such a thing we call a universal. So it is in fact the universal that is the true [content] of sense-
certainty... The same will be the case with the other form of 'This', with 'Here'. 'Here' is e.g., the tree. If I turn 
round, this truth has vanished and is converted into its opposite: 'No tree is here, but a house instead'. 'Here' 
itself does not vanish; on the contrary, it abides constant in the vanishing of the house, the tree, etc., and is 
indifferently house or tree. Again, therefore, the 'This' shows itself to be a mediated simplicity, or a 
universality... [S]ense-certainty has demonstrated in its own self that the truth of its object is the universal.” 
(Phenomenology of Spirit: 60-61) 
13 By this, I mean being endowed with capacities that enable us to draw distinctions and similarities – 
determinate negations – and relations between things – formal and informal inferences.  
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From the above passage, we can construct the following argument: 
(1) If the finite is separate from the infinite, then there is something outside of the 
infinite. 
(2) There is nothing outside of the infinite.  
(3) Therefore, the finite is not separate from the infinite. 
 
As we can see from my formulation of Hegel’s argument, his argument is one which has 
neither the dialectical function of a narrow transcendental argument nor the logical structure 
of a narrow transcendental argument.14 For, Hegel is concerned with dismissing the claims of 
pre-Kantian rationalists as metaphysical conjecture, since if the infinite were understood in 
opposition to the finite, then the infinite would be finite itself, because it would be limited by 
the finite. “There would then be per impossibile a greater reality than the infinite. Hence, the 
true infinite must therefore include the finite” (Beiser 2005, 142). I think that, given Hegel’s 
concerns here, there is very good reason to regard his argument as using a metaphysical 
transcendental claim for a non-sceptical effect, to argue that the finite does not lie outside the 
infinite.   
      Thus far, we have seen the use of transcendental claims independently of the project of 
narrow transcendental argumentation by understanding transcendental claims as having a 
function and value in the domain of epistemology/philosophy of mind and in the domain of 
metaphysics. I now wish to discuss another instance of a transcendental claim not being used 
for anti-sceptical purposes. In what follows, I argue that we can interpret Paul Grice’s 
Cooperative Principle and his norms of conversation as comprising transcendental claims and 
that these transcendental claims do not form any part of any narrow transcendental argument.   
                                                 
14 Another example of the presence of transcendental claims in the domain of metaphysics is Hegel’s discussion 
of Spinoza’s ‘All Determination is Negation’ Principle. For Hegel, the negation that accompanies determination 
is a necessary condition for the possibility of being in any genuine sense. In other words, Hegel claims that if 
anything is to be, then it must have determination and so negation. His argument can be understood as follows: 
for anything to be more than just a completely formal and abstract pure being, which for Hegel is the same as 
nothingness, there must be some kind of determination. Such determination must involve some negation. As 
Stern writes, “the principle thus plays an important role within Hegel’s ontological position, where it is crucial 
to his case against Parmenidean monism, which treats reality as a ‘one’, lacking in any element of difference; 
rather, Hegel argues, reality must incorporate some element of differentiation, of distinctions within being, 
where without these ‘negations’ it would not comprise determinate being, but would be no more than the 
nothingness of pure being”. (Stern, forthcoming, 2) Now, there seems to be good reason to interpret Hegel’s use 
of the ‘all determination is negation’ principle as a transcendental claim: here, Hegel is interested in establishing 
the necessary conditions for the possibility of being as being proper.  
It is important to note here that Stern emphasises that the way Hegel understands the ‘All Determination is 
Negation’ principle seems to be the opposite of the way in which Spinoza himself understands it.  
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      Grice (1975, 26-30) proposed a general Cooperative Principle, which is composed of four 
norms governing proper linguistic interaction with fellow speakers: 
 
Cooperative Principle: Contribute what is required by the accepted purpose of the 
conversation. 
 
Maxim of Quality: Make your contribution true; so do not convey what you believe false or 
unjustified. 
Maxim of Quantity: Be as informative as required. 
Maxim of Relation: Be relevant. 
Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous; so avoid obscurity and ambiguity, and strive for brevity 
and order. 
 
Grice does not take these norms of assertion which constitute the Cooperative Principle to be 
mere socio-linguistic conventions. Rather, Grice regards these norms of assertion which 
constitute the Cooperative to represent necessary conditions for the possibility of proper 
conversation between competent language users. As Grice writes,  
 
The presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out; for 
even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an 
argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as a conversational 
implicature; it will be a conventional implicature. To work out that a particular 
conversational implicature is present, the hearer will rely on the following data: (1) the 
conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references 
that may be involved; (2) the Cooperative Principle and its maxims; (3) the context, 
linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance; (4) other items of background knowledge; and 
(5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings 
are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the 
case. A general pattern for the working-out of a conversational implicature might be 
given as follows: He has said that q; there is no reason to suppose that he is not 
observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not be doing this 
unless he thought that p; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see 
that the supposition that he thinks that p is required; he has done nothing to stop me 
thinking that p; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that p; 
and so he has implicated that p. (Grice 1975, 31) 
 
 
To see why the Cooperative Principle and its norms of assertion are transcendental claims, 
consider the following scene from The Last Samurai: Captain Nathan Algren has recently 
been captured by the Samurai Lord Katsumoto. After several weeks of being slowly nursed 
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back to health having suffered injuries in a skirmish with Katsumoto’s warriors, Algren is 
summoned to meet Katsumoto. The Samurai Lord, upon seeing Algren enter his quarters, 
rises from his meditative position on the floor and formally introduces himself to the 
American officer: “My name is Katsumoto. What is your name?” Algren does not reply. 
Taken slightly aback by the American’s refusal to reciprocate formal courtesies, Katsumoto 
then says the following: “Many of our customs seem strange to you. And the same is true of 
yours. For example, not introducing yourself is considered extremely rude, even among 
enemies”. After a brief pause, Algren then replies to Katsumoto giving him his rank and full 
name. Having seen his formal introduction reciprocated, Katsumoto then informs Algren that: 
“I have introduced myself. You have introduced yourself. This is a very good conversation”. 
What is relevant to our discussion here is that Katsumoto only regards his linguistic 
interaction with Algren to amount to a proper conversation – what he claims to be a “very 
good conversation” – once the American officer reciprocates the relevant implicatures in the 
various speech acts. It is not just that Algren is being rude and rather uncouth by not 
following the relevant norms of conversation here, it is also that Katsumoto does not think 
that the two language users can be in the position of having a conversation unless the 
Cooperative Principle is adhered to by both parties.15 
      Given what I have just written, it may seem implausible to think that unless Algren 
adheres to the Cooperative Principle, then he and Katsumoto cannot have a conversation. For, 
we can suppose that Algren had lied about his rank, etc. In such a case, they would be having 
a conversation, but not a good one. However, the problem with this objection is its conflation 
of having a conversation with exchanging words with another competent language-user: 
Algren lying about his rank when replying to Katsumoto’s request obviously constitutes him 
speaking to Katsumoto, but it does not appear to constitute conversing with Katsumoto. 
When Katsumoto says that his linguistic interaction with Algren is a very good conversation, 
he is not meaning that it is a conversation that has given him a lot of pleasure and enjoyment. 
Rather, his use of the normative property ‘good’ is meant to express his gratitude to Algren 
for having made their linguistic interaction now a bona fide conversation. To this extent, the 
Cooperative Principle and its constituent maxims function as necessary conditions for the 
possibility of such communication.  
                                                 
15 This is linked to the idea that conversation must involve sharing of knowledge.  
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      The final example I wish to discuss concerns Knud Ejler Løgstrup’s views on trust in his 
Ethical Demand. According to Løgstrup, trust is more basic than mistrust. As he writes in the 
following passages:  
 
It is characteristic of human life that we normally encounter one another with natural 
trust … Initially we believe one another’s word; initially we trust one another. This may 
indeed seem strange, but it is part of what it means to be human. Human life could 
hardly exist if it were otherwise. We would simply not be able to live; our life would be 
impaired and wither away if we were to suspect the other of thievery and falsehood 
from the very outset. (The Ethical Demand, 8-9) 
 
While helpful in some ways, social conventions may also obscure the significance of 
trust, as these conventions reduce the level of what is expected of us. We need such 
conventions to give form to our lives, but their effect is to overlay the significance of 
trust – where children stand outside these conventions, and thus have a clearer view of 
trust. (The Ethical Demand, 19-20) 
 
 
According to Stern,16 Løgstrup’s treatment of trust involves a crucial question concerning 
how to understand his claim that trust is more basic than mistrust – that trust has priority over 
mistrust. For example, various kinds of priority are possible:17 
 
1. Psychological: trust is the attitude we start out with, not distrust [developmental 
priority] 
2. Transcendental: trust is warranted as the default attitude, grounded in the necessary 
conditions of our fundamental practices, distrust is not [rational priority] 
3. Value: trust is a prima facie good, so distrust can only be a privation or deficient form 
of trust [axiological priority] 
4. Ontological: that trust is possible is not a result of our social arrangements, but is 
essential to the proper functioning of human life itself, whereas distrust is not 
essential in this way [priority in being] 
 
There is particularly compelling reason to think, as Stern does, that while we should 
understand Løgstrup’s claim that trust is basic as primarily a thesis concerning the claims of 
axiological and ontological priority which need to be treated as interdependent, Løgstrup’s 
                                                 
16 See Stern (forthcoming 2016).  
17 Cf. Stern forthcoming 2016, 6 – where pages are referenced as the pages in the manuscript.  
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complex position does nonetheless comprise a transcendental element.18 To see why, 
consider the following passage:  
 
Let us imagine that we stand facing a destroyer who is trying to win us for his cause, 
but we know that he will shun no means in doing so and that he is not to be trusted. 
Face to face with the destroyer, we discover how much effort it takes to remain on our 
guard. The thought that, by talking things out, we would be able to dissuade the 
destroyer from his destructive enterprise keeps presenting itself; there is no eradicating 
it once and for all. We must keep telling ourselves that it is an illusion to think that we 
could talk things out, and must continually bear in mind that anything we say will be 
used to put a third vulnerable party out of the way. But why is that thought so 
persistent? Why do we need to make such an effort to restrain ourselves, and why do we 
experience doing so as nothing less than contrary to nature? It is because we are 
opposing the requirement inherent in speech that speech be open. To speak is to speak 
openly. The requirement comes from speech, springs from speech itself, is identical 
with its definitive character qua spontaneous expression of life, and is imposed by 
speech at the very instant in which I have recourse to it and realise myself in it … If I 
deceive another or raise my guard, I challenge the definitive feature of speech which 
attaches to it in advance of, and independently of, me. (Beyond the Ethical Demand, 54-
55)19 
   
 
Here, we can see that Løgstrup draws a specific connection between speech and trust in the 
sense of ‘openness’ – where speech is understood qua the social practice of linguistic 
communication with another speaker. The connection consists in how speech is not possible 
unless there is general openness and trust between the relevant speakers. Such a claim 
appears to be a transcendental claim. As with the previous examples we have discussed, we 
can notice that a transcendental claim is being made but crucially that transcendental claim is 
being made independently of any narrow transcendental argument. What this means is that 
                                                 
18 See the following from Stern: 
 
“It should be clear, therefore, that on Løgstrup’s account, the claims of axiological and ontological priority need 
to be thought together: the latter claim is not a value neutral one, for example like the claim that individuals are 
prior to social agents as the latter are not possible without the former. Rather, the ontological priority of trust 
stems from the fact that trust is a requirement or condition for the proper functioning of human life, which is 
what makes it something we do not create ourselves (ontological priority), but also makes it a fundamental good 
and thus prior in this sense too, as having a value that is also not attributed to it by us (axiological priority). 
This also shows why the two kinds of priority we rejected – psychological and transcendental – may nonetheless 
come to have some place in Løgstrup’s account in a suitably modified way. For while we argued that Løgstrup’s 
view does not operate at just a psychological level, and we can now see why, nonetheless we can also see why 
he appeals to psychological evidence of the damaging effects of distrust on children and adults. And likewise, 
while we also argued that Løgstrup’s view does not argue primarily for the rational priority of trust over distrust 
on the grounds that the latter makes the former possible, nonetheless his claims about the ontological priority of 
trust do nonetheless contain what might be thought of as a world-directed transcendental claim, namely that trust 
is a necessary condition to the proper functioning of human life on which distrust is parasitic, and thus is a 
normative structure in which we are grounded as a ‘given’, rather than something we create for ourselves and 
for which we can claim any credit” (Stern forthcoming 2016, 25). 
19 A similar point is made also in pp. 83-5.   
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we can legitimately separate the project of making transcendental claims from the project of 
narrow transcendental argumentation – to put this more simply, our discussion has now 
enabled us to assert the following: a narrow transcendental argument necessarily involves the 
use of transcendental claims; but one can make transcendental claims independently of 
situating those kind of claims within the framework of narrow transcendental arguments.  
      Given this, though, one may well ask what the consequences of this discovery are for 
Kant’s transcendentalism. One can recall how since the mid-1960s, there has been a 
concerted effort on the part of many analytic philosophers interested in Kant to separate the 
project of transcendental argumentation from transcendental idealism. But now, if what I 
have offered is convincing, there may now be a concerted effort to separate transcendental 
claims from the project of narrow transcendental argumentation. Where the battle-cry used to 
be to save transcendental arguments from the pitfalls of transcendental idealism, one may 
well now ask to save transcendental claims from the pitfalls of narrow transcendental 
argumentation.  
      I readily admit that the kind of direction I have taken with regard to transcendental claims 
and transcendental argumentation is certainly not an orthodox Kantian one. In fact, what I 
have proposed, particularly with regard to the two examples from Hegel I discussed, is a 
transformation of Kant’s transcendentalism. It is not just that we are no longer binding 
transcendental claims to transcendental idealism, we are also no longer binding 
transcendental claims to any project aimed at defeating scepticism. Rather, the new directions 
for transcendentalism – making transcendental claims independently of the framework of a 
narrow transcendental argument – illustrate how this philosophical school of thought can 
make substantive and engaging contributions to areas of constructive philosophy from 
metaphysics to social epistemology. Such a new course is certainly strange for anyone with a 
penchant for orthodox Kantianism, but I think such a change of direction is not just desirable 
but maybe even necessary for the possibility of taking transcendentalism particularly 
seriously.   
      However, one might question the alleged pay-off of separating the project of making 
transcendental claims and the project of narrow transcendental argumentation. One may well 
ask if the project of making transcendental claims is completely divorced from issues 
concerning the viability of the project of narrow transcendental argumentation. For example, 
one major issue in the literature on transcendental arguments is whether it is more plausible 
to regard transcendental arguments as being self-directed or as being world-directed. In other 
14 
 
words, whether a transcendental argument should be understood as establishing the necessary 
conditions for the possibility of language or our use of certain concepts, or whether a 
transcendental argument should be understood as establishing facts about the structure of 
reality. It is often taken as granted that a transcendental argument can only and should only 
aspire to establish self-directed conclusions, such as ‘We must think that there is a mind-
independent external world’, as the sceptic would only be prepared to accept this sort of 
conclusion rather than a conclusion which stated ‘There is an external world’. However, even 
though the project of making transcendental claims is not concerned with defeating sceptical 
positions, one might think that there are different but still related concerns for what kinds of 
transcendental claims we are able to make and what kinds of transcendental claims have 
greater value. For example, can we only make comparatively fewer world-directed 
transcendental claims than self-directed transcendental claims? One can note that the kind of 
transcendental claim I have predominantly focused on in this paper seems to be a self-
directed transcendental claim, as most of my examples have been interested in issues 
concerning the conditions of reference, the conditions of language, and the conditions of 
proper conversation.20 If we can only make more self-directed transcendental claims then we 
can world-directed transcendental claims, does this mean that the project of making self-
directed transcendental claims is more valuable than the project of making world-directed 
transcendental claims? Is it potentially less valuable in some way if we focus on modalities 
concerning our capacities than if we focus on modalities concerning the structure of certain 
metaphysical phenomena? Furthermore, can we really ever avoid Körner’s objection that it 
seems almost impossible to get the data from empirical and cognitive science that shows that 
transcendental claims really do have apodictic modal content, for even though Körner 
focused his critique on transcendental arguments and their apparent ability to defeat 
scepticism, there seems no reason to think his general criticism cannot equally apply to the 
project of making transcendental claims?  
      I cannot answer all these questions properly due to the constraints of this paper. However, 
what I would like to do is briefly explicate which approach I would favour. As we are no 
longer dealing with narrow transcendental arguments but just transcendental claims, the 
sceptic about knowledge of the external world or the sceptic about the possibility of morality 
– to name but a few sceptical positions – is now off the dialectical scene. As such, there is no 
                                                 
20 An example of a world-directed transcendental claim could be Hegel’s theory of infinity, which was sketched 
out on pp. 7-8. Another example of a world-directed transcendental claim could also be Hegel’s understanding 
of the Spinozist principle ‘All Determination is Negation’. I have briefly discussed this in footnote 14.  
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obligation on the part of the exponent of transcendental philosophy to frame transcendental 
claims in such a way as to satisfy the sceptic. Of course, this sets the bar partially lower, to 
the extent that if one wishes to object to world-directed transcendental claims, these worries 
would have to come from more general worries anyone might have regarding the modal 
claims involved. As such, if my arguments have been successful, the new target of the project 
of making transcendental claims could be someone like Körner who, rather than be 
principally concerned with the idea that the transcendental claim is literally true, is more 
concerned with the idea that we can find the relevant data from empirical and cognitive 
science to support the notion that these claims really are necessary claims. However, one may 
wish to claim that modal claims involved in self-directed transcendental claims are easier to 
settle than those involved in world-directed transcendental claims. The reason for this could 
be that it is easier and apparently less problematic to establish apodictic claims about 
ourselves than facts about the world. However, I am not convinced that this Cartesian way of 
suggesting that the modal content of self-directed transcendental claims is less problematic 
than the modal content of world-directed transcendental claims is well justified. For, it is not 
clear to me that there is good reason to suppose that psychological facts are in fact less 
problematic or easier to settle than non-psychological facts. To suggest that the domain of 
psychological facts is free from the difficulties associated with the domain of non-
psychological facts appears to be dogmatic.21 
      If what I have argued has been persuasive, then it would seem that there are reasons to 
have hope for transcendental philosophy and also potentially despair for transcendental 
philosophy. One positive pay-off from separating the project of making transcendental claims 
from the project of narrow transcendental argumentation is that the sceptic is no longer a 
figure of dialectical concern. The transcendental theorist, therefore in a way, is less inhibited 
and now freer to conduct investigations into transcendental claims in the knowledge that she 
does not have to deal with the sceptic at all. Another positive pay-off is that one can notice 
just how interesting transcendental claims are independently of any anti-sceptical framework. 
However, for all of the putative attractions of the project of making transcendental claims, it 
seems that the transcendental theorist has merely exchanged one set of apparently intractable 
and debilitating problems for another set of apparently intractable and debilitating problems. 
All that has been achieved is simply jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire. Of 
course, I am not claiming that this new direction for transcendental claims is problem-free, 
                                                 
21 For further on this, see Stern (2007).  
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but what I hope one can now do with the project of making transcendental claims is open an 
engaging debate that highlights the importance and value of the kinds of issues raised in 
making transcendental claims independently of framing those claims in the context of 
defeating scepticism.  
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